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CHRISTOPHER Bovls*

Legal Aspects of the European Union's
Public Finances: The Budget and the
Communities' Own Resources System
The Communities' financial system is of great legal significance. It is an organization working towards integration under the framework of the achievement of the
Communities' objectives. It is also unique in that it establishes the Communities'
complete independence from the Member States' public finances. The latter element reveals an inherent difference of the Communities' financing from the
arrangements applying to most international organizations. From a legal point
of view, the budget has the same significance in Community law as in the laws
of the Member States, since the budget contains an estimation and authorization
of the expenses in a particular financial year.
The budgetary procedure is the legal basis for the Communities' expenditures.
One could argue that the procedure plays a federalizing function within the whole
integration process. On the other hand, the existence of the Communities' own
resources system is one of the main characteristics of the European Communities
and symbolizes, in the budget sector, the originality of European integration.
The Communities' own resources consists of a tax revenue allocated to the Communities to finance their budget that then accrues to the Communities automatically without the need for any subsequent decision by the national authorities.
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*J.D., Dip. Econ., LL.M., M.Phil.; Attorney at Law, Athens and Luxembourg; Fellow, Institute
of European Public Law, University of Hull.
This work is a summary of a research project carried out under the Robert Schumann Scheme at
the European Investment Bank during 1991. The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Lord
Slynn of Hadley, then Advocate-General of the European Court of Justice, for his invaluable help.
The research seeks to examine some of the most important difficulties arising from the interpretation
and application of the European Union's public finances and is based on official materials and primary
legislation. The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly personal.
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I. The Basic Legislative Instruments of the Communities' Budget
The complexity of a Community's budget is obvious in that it consists of:

general provisions applicable in all areas; specific financial rules for the various
Community policies; and a range of political agreements designed to resolve
certain practical problems that do not have the force of law.

A.

GENERAL PROVIsIoNs APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS

This category covers primary legislation consisting of the financial provisions
of the original Treaties' and their amendments. 2 It contains the Acts of Accessions
during the first and second enlargement of the Communities, as well as the Single
European Act (SEA), 4 which included references to the planned development of
the European Currency Unit (ECU), contained a series of provisions on cohesion
(as far as structural funds are concerned), and provide a framework for a research
and technological development policy that will have major financial implications.

1. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY]

56-99; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] arts.
199-209; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]

arts.

arts. 171-183.
2. See generally TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(1967)

[MERGER TREATY], amended by TREATY AMENDING CERTAIN

BUDGETARY PROVISIONS OF THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND OF
THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (1970) [FIRST BUDGETARY TREATY], amended by TREATY AMENDING CERTAIN BUDGETARY PROVISIONS OF THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND OF THE
TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1975) [SECOND BUDGETARY TREATY].
3. See generally TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS (MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES), THE
KINGDOM OF DENMARK, IRELAND, THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK,
IRELAND, THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1972);
TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, IRELAND, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE GRAND DUCHY OF
LUXEMBOURG, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND (MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES) AND THE HELLENIC
REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (1979); TREATY BETWEEN THE
KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE
HELLENIC REPUBLIC, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, IRELAND, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE GRAND DUCHY
OF LUXEMBOURG, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND (MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES), AND THE KINGDOM
OF SPAIN, THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN
AND THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND TO THE EUROPEAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY

4. 1987 O.J. (L 169).
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Finally the category comprises the decisions on its resources.5 These decisions
rank as equivalent to treaties because Member States adopted them in accordance
with their constitutional requirements and with the approval of their parliaments.
On the other hand, the framework will not be complete until secondary legislation
implements the above-mentioned primary provisions concerning the operating
rules for the general and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) budget.
The amended Financial Regulation was made by the Council and passed unanimously on a proposal from the Commission after consultation with the European
Parliament. This regulation is of great importance. 6 It is the basic instrument for
the implementation of the Budget by the Commission.
In addition, Regulations 2891/77 and 2899/77, as amended, implement the
Communities' own resources. 7 The rules governing the operating of the ECSC
budget are the updated General Decisions 2/52 and 3/52.'
B.

SPECIFIC FINANCIAL RULES FOR THE VARIOUS COMMUNITY POLICIES

The Rules are provisions concerning financial characteristics of certain Community policies such as methods of financing, administrative mechanisms, and
specific budget proceedings of the major Community funds. 9
C. A

RANGE OF POLITICAL AGREEMENTS DESIGNED TO RESOLVE CERTAIN
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT Do NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF A LAW

Acts of this kind that are related to the budget are: the Joint Declaration of
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission of 197510 on Community acts of
general application that have appreciable financial implications; the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission of 1982
on various measures to improve budgetary procedure; and the Interinstitutional

5. Council Decision 70/243, 1970 O.J. SPEC. ED. 224, amended by Council Decision 85/275,
1985 O.J. (L 114) and Council Decision 88/376, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 24.

6. See 1977 O.J. (L 356) 1, amended by Council Regulation 2049/88, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 3.
7. Council Regulation 2891/77, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 1, amended by Council Regulation 3760/
86, 1986 O.J. (L 349) 1; Council Regulation 2899/77, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 8, amended by Council
Regulation 1990/88, 1988 O.J. (L 1976) 1.

8. See 1952 J.O. SPEC. ED.
9. Regulation 25/62 created the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),
1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 210) 1. Regulation 907/73 established the European Fund for Monetary

Cooperation, 1973 O.J. (L 89) 2. Decision 71/66 established the European Social Fund, 1966 O.J.
(L 32) 1. Regulation 724/75 established the European Regional Development Fund, 1975 O.J. (L
73) 8. Regulation 337/75 established the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, 1975 O.J. (L 39) 1. Regulation 1365/75 established the European Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1975 O.J. (L 139) 1.

10. Communication from the Commission concerning the value of the European unit of account,
1975 O.J. (C 120) 1.
11. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on various
measures to improve the budgetary procedure, 1982 O.J. (C 194) 1.
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Agreement of 198812 on budgetary discipline and improvement of budgetary
procedure.

II. The Main Principles of Community Public Finance
The main budgetary rules of the Community are the rule of unity, the rule of
universality, the rule of annuality, the rule of equilibrium, the rule of specification,
and the rule of the unit of account. All find legal expression in articles of treaties
concerning financial provisions and in secondary Community legislation, mainly
in the Financial Regulations. A more detailed analysis from a legal point of view
follows.
A.

THE RULE OF UNITY

This rule means that all Community revenue and expenditures must be incorporated into a single budget. The tendency towards budgetary uniformity manifested
in the Merger Treaty is the logical consequence of the rationalization of the
institutions of the three Communities. At the same time the rule demonstrates the
desire to ensure a more transparent expenditure policy that facilitates supervision
initially by the Member States and then by the Community institutions once they
introduce their own resource systems. Budgetary unity finds legal support in
article 199 of the EEC Treaty in conjunction with article 1(1) sections 2 and
3 of the Financial Regulation.' 3 The single budget includes the administrative
expenditure and related revenue of the ECSC, the administrative and operational
expenses and related revenue of the EEC and Euratom Treaties, and the revenue
and expenses of the research and investment budget of Euratom. Actual practice,
however, reveals many exceptions to the unity rule.
The operational expenditure and revenue of the ECSC form the subject of a
separate budget. ECSC levies finance the budget and can cover expenditure on
the promotion of technical and economic research and the readaptation of the
workforce. The legal status of the ECSC operational budget prohibits any formal
integration into the general budget. The latter could only be achieved revision
of the ECSC Treaty.
Some of the Communities' satellite bodies operate independently with separate
budgets, although their revenue is drawn from a balancing subsidy included in
the annual general budget. These institutions are the European Investment Bank,
the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation, the Euratom Supply Agency,
Euratom Joint Undertakings, the European Centre for Development of Vocational
Training, and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 14 Member States' contributions completely outside the framework
12. 1988 O.J. (L 185) 33.
13. See supra note 6.
14. See supra note 9.
VOL. 28, NO. 3
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of the Community budget finance the operations of the European Development
Fund. Finally, borrowing and lending operations of the three treaties are not
shown in the budget.
B.

THE RULE OF UNIVERSALITY

Interrelated with the rule of unity is the rule of universality. It consists of two5
elements: the nonassignment rule established by article 6 of Decision 88/376' 6
and the gross budget principle found in article 3(1) of the Financial Regulation. 1
Budgetary universality means that budgetary revenue may not be assigned to
particular items of expenditure and that no adjustments may be made between
revenue and expenditure. Therefore, budget revenue is pooled and used without
distinction to finance all expenditure. Transparency, equity, discipline, and effective supervision are the motives behind the principle of universality. However,
exceptions to nonassignment rules include: supplementary research programs
such as the one concerning the financing of the high flux reactor operations at
Petten under article 11(2)(1) of Council Decision of 1988;17 revenue earmarked
for a specific sector as provided for in article 3(2) of the Financial Regulation
(income from foundation, gifts and bequests, and the proceeds from the supply
of goods and services to third parties); and finally, the European Agriculture
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) monetary reserve introduced by article
10 of Decision 88/37718 as a specific statement of expenditure in the budget in
order to cope with unforeseen movements-fluctuations in the dollar/ECU market
rate. An amount of ECU 1,000 million is to be entered each year as a reserve
in the budget. These costs will be covered by revenue specially called in under
the fourth GNP-based resource according to article 6 of Decision 88/376 regarding
the Communities' own resources.
C.

THE RULE OF ANNUALITY

The principle of annuality derives its legal status from the first paragraph of
article 199 of the EEC Treaty and article 1(1) of the Financial Regulation as far
as estimates are concerned. With regards to the implementation of the budget,
article 202(1) of the EEC Treaty and article 1(2) of the Financial Regulation
establish that the expenditure shown in the budget shall be authorized for one
financial year. According to article 203(1) of the EEC Treaty and article 5 of
the Financial Regulation, the financial year shall coincide with the calendar year.
The rule of annuality seems at first sight incompatible with the multiannual
operations that the Community must carry on. Indeed, many programs, due to

15.
16.
17.
18.

Council Decision 88/376, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 24.
See supra note 6.
Council Decision 88/376, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 1.
Council Decision 88/377, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 29.
FALL 1994
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their complexity and importance, require more than one financial year to be
completed. A solution to this problem appears to be the entry of differentiated
appropriations in each budget so that long-term operations can be financed. Differentiated appropriations include both commitment and payment appropriations.
In current budgetary practice, administrative expenditure, EAGGF guaranteed
expenditure, repayments to Member States, and loan guarantees are entered into
the budget in the form of nondifferentiated appropriations. All other categories
of expenditures are made up entirely or partially of differentiated appropriations.
Their existence may be seen as a legitimate simplification providing for flexibility
in the Community financing system.
Nonetheless, this practice does result in some considerable difficulties. The
introduction of the concept of differentiated appropriations automatically leads
to a gap between commitments entered into and payments made. This gap is
known as the "cost of the past" and represents the time lag between the time
the commitments are entered into and the time the corresponding payments are
made. Taking into consideration the equilibrium rule (discussed below) this practice may lead to imbalances. The situation may deteriorate when so-called "dormant commitments" no longer correspond to operational projects. The granting
of new appropriations is the only way to achieve clearance of this kind of commitment. However, new appropriations will also lead to imbalance because no corresponding revenues will be in place to balance these commitments. To remedy the
situation the Commission conducted a purge of dormant commitments in 1986
and 1987.19 The Council also decided to impose a discipline on the utilization
of differentiated appropriations. Decision 376/88 regarding the Communities'
resources held that multiannual measures must contain a time limit for implementations that must be specified to the recipient according to article 3(1). Quite
similarly, article 6 of the amended Financial Regulation provides that differentiated appropriations not completely used at the end of the financial year will lapse.
By virtue of point 6 of article 6, mutiannual projects that are not carried out within
a financial year are automatically cancelled. This provision seeks to penalize
inadequate monitoring of appropriations.
Finally, the implication of the rule of annuality for the revenue of the budget
is that if a surplus over total expenditure exists at the end of the financial year
then the surplus is carried over to the following year under article 5 of the Financial
Regulation.
D.

THE RULE OF EQUILIBRIUM

The principle that revenue and expenditure must be in balance, is established
in article 199(2) of the EEC Treaty, article 20(1) of the Merger Treaty (as amended

19. See 73 EUR. COMMUNITY BULL. 43 (1986) (preliminary draft budget for 1986); 74 EUR.
66 (1987).

COMMUNITY BULL.
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by the first Budgetary Treaty), and the three resource decisions. Paradoxically,
the equilibrium rule applies only to the general budget. ECSC annual budget
imbalances are allowed, but must be cancelled out eventually. The application
of the equilibrium principle in practical terms means that the Communities, unlike
the Member States, are not allowed to borrow to cover their expenditures.
In practice, budgetary balance is a difficult goal due to differences between
the forecasts made at the authorization stage and the actual financial outgo. Theoretically speaking, the budget must be in balance at the time of its adoption.
Revenue and expenditure must be exactly the same. The appropriations authorized
are absolute ceilings and actual revenue must be below the estimates or, at best,
exactly the same as the estimates. The revenue and expenditure account at the
end of the financial year can show either a positive balance (surplus) or a negative
balance (deficit). In the former case, the balance has been maintained through
the financial year; thus, the surplus will be carried forward to the following
financial year and entered on the revenue side, usually by means of an amending
budget. In the latter case, budgetary balance has not been achieved and the deficit
again will be entered on the revenue side of the proceeding year's budget by
means of a supplementary budget. The difference between an amending and a
supplementary budget is that the first leaves the overall volume of expenditure
unchanged or even reduces it, whereas the second increases the volume of expenditure of the initial budget under article 1(5) of the Financial Regulation.
In the mid-1980s the general budget closed with deficits in 1984, 1985, and
1986, when the Communities' resources ceiling proved inadequate to balance
the expenditure. 20 The situation was so serious that even the additional contributions by the Member States under the Intergovernmental agreements were not
enough.
In order to avoid future deficits, a "negative reserve" mechanism appeared
in the 1986 budget.2 1The mechanism worked to secure agreement between the
council and the European Parliament regarding the rate of increase of noncompulsory expenditure. In effect, that mechanism transferred appropriations that were
not used during the financial year to this negative reserve. A secondary effect
was to restore equilibrium in cases of imbalance. The negative reserve system
is now established in Regulation 2049/88,22 and the maximum amount is limited
to ECU 200 million. No negative reserves were included in the 1988, 1989,
1990, and 1991 budgets.

E.

THE RULE OF SPECIFICATION

According to article 202 of the EEC Treaty and article 15 of the Financial
Regulation, each appropriation must have a given purpose and be assigned to a
20. See European Parliament session documents for 1984, 1985, 1986.
21. See 73 EUR. COMMUNITY BULL. 49 (1986).

22. See Council Regulation 2049/88, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 3.
FALL 1994
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specific objective in order to prevent any confusion between appropriations at
both the authorization and execution stages. The budget must be unambiguous
and allow for smooth execution by the budgetary authority. The rule of specification also applies to revenue, requiring full descriptions and clear identification
of the various sources of revenue paid into the budget.
A transfer mechanism is used to assist flexibility during execution and is described in article 205 of the EEC Treaty and article 21 of the Financial Regulation.
A transfer can occur between chapters and between articles within the same
chapter.
The European Parliament approves or rejects transfers of noncompulsory expenditure by simple majority vote after consulting the Council.23 For transfers
of compulsory expenditure, the Council approves or rejects the expenditure by
qualified majority after consulting the European Parliament.
F.

THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT

One feature that distinguishes the Communities from other international organizations in budgetary matters is that the general budget is expressed in units of
account which are distinct from the national currencies of the Member States.
The unit of account finds legal support in Decision 3/52 of the ECSC, article
207 of the EEC Treaty, and article 181 of the Euratom Treaty. Initially the unit
of account was the U.S. dollar, which the European Payments Union used in
the framework of the ECSC. Up to the 1970s, the unit of account was expressed
in a "gold parity" unit in accordance with the Bretton Woods Agreements. This
period was indeed fruitful for the Communities with monetary stability (at the
expense of the dollar and U.S. balance of payments) assisting the completion of
the transitional period. In the early 1970s the Nixon administration dismantled
the so-called golden rule and all references to gold were dropped. A search then
ensued for a replacement. After a transitional period from 1978 to 1980 in which
the EUA (European Unit of Account) was introduced, the Community applied
the ECU to the general budget from January of 1981. The ECU is based on a
weighted basket of the currencies of all Member States calculated daily.
Therefore, external monetary fluctuation is inevitable and the U.S. dollar again
plays the role of the reserve currency, even after the full introduction of the
European Monetary System exchange rate mechanism. Despite the widespread
application of the ECU as the unit of account for drafting and implementing the
budget, debts and claims are hardly expressed or paid in ECUs. Exchange rate
fluctuations imply a great deal of risk and lead to uncertainty. At present the
fluctuations in the values of the ECU in respect to conversion rates into national
currencies have led to the introduction of periodic conversion rates, a mechanism
23. See EUR PARL. RULES OF PROC. 66. The European Parliament interprets this requirement
as the majority of its current members (vacant seats are not counted).
VOL. 28, NO. 3
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that seeks monetary stability for the budget. Every financial year twelve successive series of rates are applied to budget operations for each month.
Despite the application of this system, movements in the purchasing power
of the budget still occur. The estimate of an appropriation inevitably differs
from the final cost of its execution. The difference depends on the geographical
estimation of the expenditure. Since payments or the execution of the budget are
made in national currencies, the purchasing power of the budget varies over time.

M. The Legal Framework of the Communities' Own Resources System
An expansion of the Communities' own resources system to replace the contributions of the Member States was envisaged in the EEC and Euratom Treaties.
As for the ECSC Treaty, it had its own resources-levies on coal and steel
products-from the time it entered into force in 1952. Article 173 of the Euratom
Treaty specifies Communities' own resources as "the proceeds of levies collected
by the Community in Member States," 24 whereas article 201 of the EEC Treaty
reads: "revenue accruing
from the common customs tariff when it has been
25
finally introduced.",
The existence of own resources is one of the main characteristics of the European Communities. The resources play a federalizing role by providing for financial autonomy as a means of achieving a common market. As previously mentioned, own resources replaced the Member States' contributions laid down in
article 200(1) of the EEC and article 172(1) of the Euratom Treaties. Finally in
1970, after a long period of gestation, the European Council decided to adopt
Decision 70/243, which introduced a system of the Communities' own resources.26 The Decision defined "own resources" as a source of revenue specific
to the Community and made a distinction between natural own resources and
value added tax' (VAT) own resources. Natural own resources resulted directly
from the existence of a unified customs area and were not attributable to the
Member States. These resources are known also as traditional own resources
and consist of agricultural levies and customs duties. VAT own resources were
revenues derived from the application of a rate not exceeding 1 percent to a VAT
base uniformly determined for the Member States in accordance with the six
VAT Directives. The rate would be set at the required level in order to achieve
budget equilibrium. Because of the delays in introducing a VAT system and
harmonizing the national laws, the decision was not generally applied until 1980.
In 1985 Decision 85/257 replaced the system." The reason is obvious. The twelve
Member States deemed the initial rate of 1 percent to the VAT base inadequate.
The next Decision raised the rate to 1.4 percent and also introduced a system
24.
25.
26.
27.

EURATOM TREATY, supra note 1, art. 173.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 201.
See supra note 5.
Id.
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for correcting budgetary imbalances by means of revenue. Decision 88/37628
followed, which retained the categories of resource already existing in addition
to creating a fourth resource resulting from the application of a rate to be determined by total Community GNP. In order to control the increase in the resources
for payment appropriations being taken from the Community, Decision 88/376
introduced an overall ceiling of 1.20 percent of total Community GNP. For
commitment appropriation, the decision also established a ceiling at 1.3 percent
of total Community GNP.
In summary, in light of Decision 88/376 the following arrangements have
applied to own resources since January 1, 1988:
(i) Agricultural levies on trade with non-Member States, including premiums, additional or compensatory amounts, and other levies in the sugar
sector according to article 2(l)(a).
(ii) Customs duties prescribed under the common customs tariff including
duties on ECSC projects on trade with non-Member States according to
article 2(1)(b).
(iii) VAT contribution up to a maximum of 1.4 percent on a uniformly established base for the Member States, not to exceed 55 percent of each
Member State's GNP, according to article 2(l)(c).
(iv) Application of a rate to be determined under the budgetary procedure in
light of all other revenue-to the sum of all Member States' GNP.
(v) The prospect of a fifth resource, namely revenue deriving from any new
charges introduced within the framework of a common policy according
to article 2(c).
IV. Legal Problems Arising from the Implementation of the Budget
The budget is the legal basis for Community expenditure. The budget is executed by the Commission 29 and other institutions to which the Commission delegates the powers necessary for the budget's implementation. Many still question
whether the budget forms an adequate legal basis for expenditure. The institutions
differ in opinion on this subject. The debate began in 1975 when the European
Parliament increasingly became involved in the adoption of the budget. 30 The
European Parliament wishes to increase its say in Community affairs by means
of the budgetary proceedings. 3 Less Council intervention in budgetary affairs
strengthens the role of the European Parliament. Therefore, the European Parliament tends to view the budget as a sufficient legal basis for operational expenses.
On the other hand, the Council shares the view that all operational expenses must
28. Id.

29. ECSC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 78c; EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 205; EURATOM
supra note 1, art. 179.
30. See the FIRST BUDGETARY TREATY and SECOND BUDGETARY TREATY, supra note 2.

TREATY,

31. See Auguer Report,
VOL. 28, NO. 3
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have a legitimate legal basis in addition to invoking the main budgetary provisions
of the Treaties. According to Tugendhat,32 the provision of appropriations in
the budget is a bookkeeping exercise. Legal certainty requires specific Treaty
provisions for the implementation of the relevant appropriations.
Both institutions consider the budget to be a sufficient legal basis for administrative expenditure. These expenditures include expenses relating to the functioning
of the Community institutions and other bodies as well as staff costs. In determining whether a separate legal basis for expenditure is necessary in addition to
inclusion in the budget, two aspects should be examined.
The first aspect concerns the question of whether the Community institutions,
when implementing the objectives of the Treaties on the legal basis of specific
provisions, may rely on the objective in order to provide the required financial
assistance for their achievement. The context of the Treaties themselves is beyond
a doubt a barrier to expenditure that Community institutions may not cross.
Therefore, by interpretation of any relevant article of the Treaties, Community
institutions may acquire the power to coordinate behavior by financial means.
The concept of implied powers has substantial importance for Community law.
It is indisputable that Community institutions may use financial means when
implementing articles 125 and 43(2)(3) of the EEC Treaty. In the former case,
by strict interpretation, community institutions do not have express authorization
for creating their financial means, but it is inconceivable to operate the ESF
(European Social Fund) under article 125(1) of the EEC Treaty without Community contributions.
In the latter case, by implication ("working out and implementing the common
agricultural policy"), the institutions may derive the power to use financial means
from article 43(2) of the EEC Treaty. Denying this power would result in a
failure to achieve the legitimate objects of these provisions. Although the court has
never used the theory of implied powers with respect to the internal competence of
the Communities, the theory quite obviously has plenty of room to develop in
budgetary affairs where the realization of the Communities' objectives take place.
Of course no Community institution has any objection that it should operate only
by supplementing existing powers and not replace or exceed them.33
The development is interesting to observe, and supports the above-mentioned
analysis of the agreement of the Council and the European Parliament during
the conciliation procedure of the Financial Regulation. 34 If the intended use of
the appropriation is for financial means to be used as a systematic and permanent
basis for policy objectives, then the budget and its explanatory notes do not form
the necessary legal basis for the use of these appropriations. A separate treaty

32. Id. Tugendhat was a member of the Commission responsible for budgets.
33. See Cointat Report, EUR. PARL. Doc. (150/78) 59.
34. See Shaw Report, EuR. PARL. Doc. (434/77) para. 30; see also Joint Declaration, supra
note 11.
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provision, providing for the appropriate legal framework for implementation of
this objective by financial assistance, will suffice.
The second aspect relates to the division of competence among the institutions
of the Communities. The budgetary authority and the legislative power are now
no longer in the same hands. An additional legal basis, apart from inclusion in
the budget, has resulted in the Council's strengthening its position. The problem
is to define the cases where this additional legal basis is deemed to be necessary.
According to Tugendhat who spoke on behalf of the Commission,35 budget lines
that form part of a Community policy but cannot be specified in the general
budget require the legal foundation of a separate treaty article. One could argue on
the basis of the specification principle, that a determination of such requirements
should occur in the Community budget's binding explanatory notes.
In my opinion, the budget can hardly be used for the determination of specific
and precise requirements, but is preferred for the abstract description of the actual
expenditures.
An agreement by the three institutions to make spending of budgetary appropriations for substantial new Community activities dependent upon the prior adoption
of a basic Regulation supports this view. 3 6 The position of the Council is strengthened as far as new policies are concerned under this interpretation. A very controversial issue that has been paid little attention concerns the distinction between
compulsory and noncompulsory expenditure. Although the budgetary powers of
the European Parliament are based on this distinction, neither the treaty nor
the specific secondary legislation provides a clear-cut definition. Therefore, the
matter is open to a wide or restrictive interpretation, depending on the institution
that makes it. One should keep in mind that the European Parliament has the
right to amend noncompulsory expenditures and to modify compulsory ones.37
The difference, between the terms of amendment and modification is determined
by who has the last say in each case.
Are there certain criteria that can be used to classify an appropriation as compulsory or noncompulsory? The question is quite complicated since apart from economic and legal concepts, the criteria determine the balance of power in budgetary
matters between the two institutions.
This question deserves more detailed analysis:
The laconic expressions found in article 203(4) and (9) of the EEC Treaty do
not provide much assistance. They only reflect the compromise between the
European Parliament and the Council regarding the division of labor in budgetary
matters. Based on the language of the articles, the Council interpreted the formula

35. See European Parliament proceedings of 11-10-1977, 1977 O.J. (Annex 221).
36. See Joint Declaration, supra note 11.
37. See ECSC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 78(4); EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 203(4);
EURATOM TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177(4).
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as following the right of amendment to apply principally to administrative expenditure, where need for supplementing legal basis does not exist.3 8
In a Resolution, 39 the Council reached agreement with the European Parliament
that the expenditure could be compulsory only in cases where no one budgetary
authority (Council, European Parliament, or Commission) could freely fix appropriations relating to it. Thus, this interpretation focuses on the potential freedom
of the institutions involved in budgetary matters.
In an official document, the Parliament has followed a different interpretation.4°
This view treats expenditure as compulsory only if the expenditure necessarily
results from the treaties or from acts adopted in accordance herewith, and the
Commission does not have the right to refuse to meet its obligation to pay when
implementing the budget. Hence, the significant point of this view is the lack
of discretion on the part of the Commission to meet its obligation to pay. The mere
fact that the Council prescribes the maximum amount of financial commitment
for the implementation of a measure is insufficient to render the expenditure
compulsory.
In my opinion, this view is too narrow. Indeed, the Commission, which is the
institution responsible for the execution of the budget, does not have discretionary
power. The institution is bound by the Treaty and the specific rules relating to
the implementation of the budget.
This distinction caused tension between the Council and the European Parliament for many years and was the main reason that the European Parliament made
use of its powers and by rejecting the budget three times. 4' To reach a common
standard by distinguishing between compulsory and noncompulsory expenditure,
the three institutions of the Communities issued a Joint Declaration in 1982 in
order to improve budgetary procedure and to establish smooth cooperation between them. 42 This Declaration defines compulsory expenditures as "such expenditure as the budgetary authority is obliged to enter in the budget to enable the
Community to meet its obligations, both internally and externally, under the
Treaties and acts adopted in accordance therewith." 43 Conversely all other expenditure is noncompulsory.
Although this Joint Declaration was passed on June 30, 1982, later that year
the European Parliament rejected the supplementary and amending budgets of
38. See Declaration of 1970 entered in the Council's minutes on the signing of the First Budgetary
Treaty. That Declaration related to what later became article 203(8) and corresponding ECSC and
EURATOM provisions.
39. Resolution of November 14, 1974, 1974 O.J. (153/34); see also EUR. PARL. Doc. (42/
1971) (Annex 1) para. 36.
40. See The Budgetary Powers of the European Parliament (The European Parliament's Directorate for Research and Documentation, October 1977).
41. The European Parliament rejected the 1980 budget, the 1983 supplementary and amending
budget, and the 1985 budget.
42. See Joint Declaration, supra note 11.
43. Id.
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1983 and in December 1984 rejected the 1985 budget. The distinction between
compulsory and noncompulsory expenditure still is the root of much of the controversy in budgetary matters. 44
In my opinion the Joint Declaration strengthened the position of the Council.
The declaration resembles the interpretation of the European Parliament's Directorate General for Research and Documentation, which although in a form of
an agreement between the Council and the European Parliament resulted in a
victory for the Council. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration includes an annex
that classifies existing budget lines into compulsory or noncompulsory expenditure and a procedure that deals with differences of opinion on the new budget
lines. The spirit of this Declaration is found in the interinstitutional agreement
and Decision 88/377. 4' Another problem closely connected with the distinction
between compulsory and noncompulsory expenditure is the maximum rate of
increase in noncompulsory expenditure. Every financial year the Commission
fixes this rate on the basis of the volume of the gross national product within
the Communities, the average variation in the budgets of the member States, and
the trend of the cost of living during the previous financial year.4 The Parliament
has two ways to exceed this maximum rule of increase: either by unilateral action
up to the half of it under article 76(g) of the ECSC Treaty, 203(9) of the EEC
Treaty, and 177(9) of the Euratom Treaty by a qualified majority, or by an
agreement between the Council in accordance with article 203 of the EEC Treaty
by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.
A case before the Court 47 concerning this matter clearly removed the earlier
limitation of this right to exceptional cases. The court said that the Second Budgetary Treaty abolished this unclear limitation. The court also observed that no
criterion has been laid down for the modification of the maximum rate of increase.
In addition, the interinstitutional agreement48 reaffirms the conclusions of this
judgment. Furthermore, the practical utility of the interinstitutional agreements
and Decision 88/377 has tempered the right of the European Parliament for the
unilateral increase of the maximum rate. In my opinion, the assistance ofjudgment
34/86, which managed to retain a great deal of power for the European Parliament
regarding the maximum rule of increase of noncompulsory expenditure was a
victory of the European Parliament.
Finally the Commission's role in the implementation of the budget is worthy of
two comments. First, the Commission has quite a peculiar role in the whole budget
framework. Its role is mainly the execution of the budget. The Commission has
no part in the preparation and adoption of the budget. Its function ends with the
44. See supra note 41.
45. 1988 O.J. (L 185) 29.
46. See ECSC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 78(9); EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 203(9);
EURATOM TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177(9).
47. Case 34/86, Council v. Parliament, [1986] E.C.R. 2155, 2208.
48. See supra note 45.
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submission of a preliminary draft budget before the Council. A strengthening of its
position was envisaged in the Resolution ofDecember 10, 1969,49 and the European
Parliament favored coequal responsibility with the Commission. However, the
Council considered that such coequal coresponsibility was far beyond the provisions of article 155 the EEC Treaty. As a result, the Commission remained with
only modest administrative action. The First and Second Budgetary Treaties and
the Communities' own resources Decisions have not altered this situation.
The second comment concerns the implementation of the budget by the Commission. The Commission is frequently bound by different forms of management
committee procedure when it grants financial support under one of the various
funds or similar programs. Under the framework of this procedure, the Council
may have the last word. The European Parliament considers this practice incompatible with article 205 of the EEC Treaty and the Commission's power to implement the budget within the limits of the Financial Regulation.
A very interesting case before the Court 50 provides a starting point for the
European Parliament. It relies on this judgment and pleads that the Council cannot
adopt decisions in individual cases relating to the implementation of the budget.
The European Parliament considers such an adoption to be a misuse of Council
power that is totally incompatible with the Treaties. In my opinion this point of
view is entirely justified in terms of expenditure whose only legal basis is the
budget. As for policy expenditure, which needs a substantive legal basis apart
from inclusion in the budget, the situation is unclear. In attempting to find an
answer, we must examine the following aspects:
The Council, when adopting a separate legal basis for the implementation of an appropriation, should be bound by article 205 of the EEC Treaty. Accordingly, action by the
Council by adopting a separate and substantive legal basis for the implementation of
a measure should be an excs de pouvoir if the Council were to confine itself to a
procedure where it reserved the right to undertake expenditure obligations or to decide
on expenditure. Article 205 is a clear provision. Council intervention with the execution
of the budget violates this article. Therefore, the role of the Council, in cases of expenditure requiring a substantive legal basis, should encompass only the adoption of the
budget. The execution of the budget should be left to the Commission in accordance
with article 205 of the EEC Treaty.
V. Legal Problems Arising from the Function of the Communities' Own
Resources System
A.

THE BRITISH PROBLEM

The first enlargement of the Communities brought about a very delicate problem, that of structural imbalance in the United Kingdom's financial links with

49. Resolution of 1969, 1969 O.J. (152) 32.
50. Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsslelle fOr Getreide und Futtermittel v. Koster, Berodt and
Co., [1970] E.C.R. 1161, 1170.
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the Community under the framework of the Communities' own resources system.
The problem origin is the special situation of the United Kingdom, which has a
small agricultural sector with a large proportion of farm products imported from
outside the Community. As a result, very little of the Community's agricultural
spending benefits the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a large contribution to the
financing of the Communities' budget was set mainly because a large proportion
of the United Kingdom's GNP accounted for the VAT base.
The above-mentioned problem was the issue underlying the 1973 referendum
dealing with the United Kingdom's continued membership in the Community.
In an attempt to solve the problem, various arrangements were tried in succession.
Most of the arrangements were agreements of the European Council. The Dublin
arrangement 5' provided for a compensation mechanism from the Community
budget to any country in an unacceptable situation. Based on the principles of
"just return" and of partial repayment, the Dublin arrangement allowed compensation on the expenditure side in the form of specific measures for the United
Kingdom. The Fontainebleau arrangement 52 introduced a correction using a
source-oriented mechanism and was put into effect by Decision 85/257. This
decision covered two distinct arrangements: (1) For 1985 compensation was
provided by a flat-rate reduction in the United Kingdom's VAT contributions,
and (2) Compensation from 1986 applied the same principle of correction at the
source but with different rules: (a) two-thirds (66 percent) of the difference
between the United Kingdom's percentage share of VAT payments and its percentage share of allocated Community expenditure was refunded to the United Kingdom by way of a reduction in its VAT base; (b) The Member States supply the
deficiency caused by this reduction in the British contribution in accordance with
their respective percentage share of VAT payments. The Community has designed
a special regime for Germany, which pays only two-thirds of its normal share,
with the rest being divided between the other Member States.
Nobody could deny that the United Kingdom and Germany were the main
contributors to the Communities' budget during the 1970s and 1980s. The smaller
Member States were purely beneficiaries. The Fontainebleau arrangement has
now been transferred to Decision 88/376 on the own resources system.
One of the traditional own resources, agricultural levies, which are prescribed
in the own resources decisions, have created some problems of interpretation.
In fact, these levies are based on the principle of Community preference and
aim at offsetting the difference between world prices and Community prices.
Normally, under this interpretation agricultural levies cover imports from countries outside the Communities. In addition, agricultural levies apply to exports

51. Dublin European Council in November 1979, in the form of a Council Decision of May
30, 1980.
52. Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984, in the form of Council Decision 85/257,
1985 O.J. (L 143) 2.
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to align Community
prices to higher world prices and would be Communities'
53
own resources.
Furthermore, under article 2(1)(a) of Decision 88/376, Regulation 1111/77
introduced isoglucose production levies.M They are considered to have the same
function as sugar levies, even though isoglucose is not an agricultural product.
Their legality has been challenged on several occasions since isoglucose is not
a product covered by a common market organization. In addition, isoglucose
can hardly be characterized as serving the production or marketing of sugar, an
agricultural product under a common market organization according to article
40(3) of the EEC Treaty. The Court in two cases 5 followed a wide interpretation
of products related to agricultural products under a common market organization.
They held that isoglucose duties form a Community resource. After those judgments, Regulation 1111/77 was amended by Regulation 387/81,56 which is in
conformity with the Court's case law in question. Another problem related to
the own resources system concerns the harmonization of rules governing the
provision for the availability of own resources. The existence of twelve national
administrations with different rules has led to a lack of uniformity.
To resolve this problem, an Advisory Committee on Own Resources was set
up by Regulation 2891/77, 57 which was amended by Regulation 1552/89.5" The
Regulation examines all questions relating to the establishment and availability
of own resources. Two aspects of the resolution may create problems: The first
potential problem is the unwarranted collection of a sum by national authorities.
s9
According to relevant judgments before the Court in cases 26/74 and 66/8060
the person from whom the sum has been wrongly collected is entitled to repayment
in accordance with the general principle of law applicable to Community law.
The individual is without a doubt eligible to seek recovery for wrongful payment
from the national administration, including interest in accordance with national
law. Problems arise if the state in turn seeks recovery from the Commission
when the collection was the result of an error by the administration. So far, the
prevailing opinion is that a state cannot seek indemnification. A second problem
involves cases of fraud affecting the Community budget, either by a fraudulent
reduction of the amount to be paid or through a failure to declare this amount.
The national administrations and the national courts are responsible for combating
fraud since the Community collects revenue at the national level. This situation
53. Case 95/75, Effem Gmbh v. Hauptzollamt Lueneburg, [1975] E.C.R. 44.
54. Council Regulation 111/77, 1977 O.J. (L 314) 2.
55. Case 108/81, G.R. Amylum v. Council, [1981] E.C.R.; Case 110/81, Sa Roquette Fr~res
v. Council, [1981] E.C.R.
56. Council Regulation 387/81, 1981 O.J. (L 44) 1.
57. Council Regulation 2891/77, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 1.
58. Council Regulation 1552/89, 1989 O.J. (L 259) 6.
59. Case 26/74, Socidtd Roquette Fr~res v. Commission, [1974] E.C.R.
60. Case 66/80, Spa International Chemical Corporation v. Administrazione delle Finance dello
Stato, [1980] E.C.R.
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is rather unsatisfactory because in several Member States the concept of tax fraud
applies only to national revenue. National courts have no jurisdiction over criminal
acts upon the financial interests of the Community. The Commission, as the body
responsible for the observance of the Community law under article 155 of the
EEC Treaty should make use of its role as the Communities' legal personality
and take each case of fraud before national courts under article 210 and 211 of
the EEC Treaty.
In 1976 the Commission proposed an amendment to the Treaties, focusing on
article 5 of the EEC Treaty and the equivalent sections of the other two Treaties.
This proposal provided for protection of financial interests of the Community
and prosecution in cases of infringement of provisions adopted by institutions
or of provisions established by Member States' law, regulation, or administrative
action. The Commission envisaged under the proposal a double jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice and national courts. Despite the repeated demands by the
Commission and the European Parliament, no progress has been made. The only
positive outcome has been that under Regulation 1552/89 the Member States
must send a report every six months to the Commission on frauds and irregularities
affecting the Community budget.
VI. Conclusion
Far-reaching changes have altered the Community's financial system as a result
of the third enlargement that included Spain and Portugal in the Community and
by the conclusion of the Single European Act. The change has provided a sounder
political base that has permitted a thorough reform of the Community's financial
system. The Brussels European Council adopted the broad lines of the financial
reform of the Community. This decision of principle was subsequently enshrined
in formal legal instruments: Decision 88/376 concerning own resources; Decision
88/377 on budgetary discipline; and Regulation 2052/88 with regard to the reform
of the structural funds.
By improving the budgetary procedure, these changes aim at ending the repeated annual lashes among Community institutions concerning the establishment
of the budget. Furthermore, they provide the financial scope for an orderly increase in the finances of Europe.
So far, the system seems to work, although some legal problems concerning
interpretation still exist. This article does not propose a solution to these problems.
It rather seeks to shed some light on the Community's public finance system.
In the future, practice and experience with the contribution of the Court of Justice
will provide real answers.
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